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THE TRUTH BEHIND ECHOLS V. STATE:  
HOW AN ALFORD GUILTY PLEA  
SAVED THE WEST MEMPHIS THREE 
Kaytee Vota* 
After they spent eighteen years in prison for the notorious 1993 murders 
of three young boys, the West Memphis Three were released on 
August 19, 2011, after they entered Alford pleas. Under an Alford plea, 
a defendant can voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly plead 
guilty while he simultaneously proclaims his innocence. But with little 
evidence linking the West Memphis Three to the crime and with recent 
DNA evidence likely establishing their innocence, was it appropriate for 
the Circuit Court of Craighead County, Arkansas, to allow the men to 
even plead guilty? This Comment argues that the circuit court in 
Echols v. State took a step in the wrong direction when it allowed the 
West Memphis Three to enter Alford pleas. This Comment discusses the 
background of Alford pleas and examines the inherent problems with 
their application, particularly in cases that involve DNA evidence. 
Finally, this Comment suggests a method of judicial reform that urges 
judges to proceed with caution and conduct a stricter factual-basis 
inquiry in order to prevent the injustice that arises when they allow 
innocent defendants to plead guilty. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., University of 
California, Irvine. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Professor Laurie Levenson 
for her valuable guidance and insight, and to Professor Gary Craig for his continuous 
encouragement. I also thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 
particularly Maxwell J. Wright, D. Elliot Gonzalez, and Joshua Rich, for their hard work and 
dedication. Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude to my family and friends, especially 
David Costa, for their unconditional support and love. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
They listened to heavy metal, wore black clothing, and read 
Stephen King novels, and in the eyes of their own community, they 
were the enemy.
1
 In 1994, Damien Echols, Jason Baldwin, and Jessie 
Misskelley Jr. were convicted of murdering three eight-year-old boys 
in West Memphis, Arkansas.
2
 Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley, 
collectively known by the media as the “West Memphis Three,”
3
 
pled innocent to the murders.
4
 With very little evidence to link the 
three to the murders, the “satanic panic”
5
 in West Memphis targeted 
Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley because they “stood out from 
everybody else”
6
—it was a modern-day Salem witch trial.
7
 Little did 
the West Memphis Three know at that time that, eighteen years later, 
they would plead guilty to the murders and walk away as “free” men. 
In 2002, Echols filed a motion in the Circuit Court of Craighead 
County, Arkansas, for DNA testing under the state’s newly approved 
DNA-testing statutes.
8
 Under these statutes, Echols was allowed to 
 
 1. See PARADISE LOST: THE CHILD MURDERS AT ROBIN HOOD HILLS (HBO 1996) 
[hereinafter PARADISE LOST] (documentary containing actual footage of the West Memphis 
Three trials); see also Piers Morgan Tonight: West Memphis Three (CNN television broadcast 
Sept. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Piers Morgan] (television interview with Echols and Baldwin one 
month after their release from prison). 
 2. Echols v. State (Echols I), 936 S.W.2d 509, 517 (Ark. 1996). 
 3. See MARA LEVERITT, DEVIL’S KNOT: THE TRUE STORY OF THE WEST MEMPHIS 
THREE 2 (2002); Case Introduction—Brief Overview, EXONERATE THE W. MEMPHIS THREE 
SUPPORT FUND, http://www.wm3.org/CaseIntroduction/Page/BRIEF-OVERVIEW (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Overview, EXONERATE THE WM3]. 
 4. Case Introduction—Chronology of Events, EXONERATE THE W. MEMPHIS THREE 
SUPPORT FUND, http://www.wm3.org/CaseIntroduction/Page/CHRONOLOGY-OF-EVENTS  
(last visited Feb. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Chronology, EXONERATE THE WM3]; see PARADISE 
LOST, supra note 1. 
 5. Satanic panic was a phenomenon in the 1980s and 1990s that spread throughout the 
United States as a result of hysteria. See JEFFREY S. VICTOR, SATANIC PANIC: THE CREATION OF 
A CONTEMPORARY LEGEND 60–61 (1993); see also Mel Maguire, Op-Ed., The Culture of Satanic 
Panic, ADVOCATE.COM (Sept. 1, 2011, 1:00:00 AM), http://www.advocate.com/Politics/ 
Commentary/Op-ed_The_Culture_of_Satanic_Panic (noting the satanic panic that gripped the 
town as “rumors swirled”). Baldwin’s defense counsel referred to the satanic panic in his closing 
argument. PARADISE LOST, supra note 1. 
 6. See PARADISE LOST, supra note 1 (Echols discussing how they were the “obvious 
choice”). 
 7. See LEVERITT, supra note 3, at 291 (“[Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley] began to view 
what happened in West Memphis as a modern-day version of the infamous Salem witch trials, in 
which rumors and hysteria had supplanted reason, and resulted in executions.”). 
 8. Echols v. State (Echols II), 2010 Ark. 417, at 3, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511, at *3. 
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bring a motion for DNA testing because “the testing was not 
available at the time of the trial” and the testing had “the scientific 
potential to produce new noncumulative evidence materially relevant 
to [Echols’s] assertion of actual innocence.”
9
 The DNA testing 
occurred between 2005 and 2007 and established that neither Echols 
nor the rest of the West Memphis Three was the source of any of the 
genetic material that had been gathered from the case.
10
 Furthermore, 
some of the DNA material tested was found to be consistent with that 
of Terry Hobbs (one victim’s stepfather) and his friend.
11
 In response 
to these findings,
12
 Echols filed a motion for a new trial, but the 
circuit court denied the motion, claiming that the DNA results were 
“inconclusive.”
13
 
Echols appealed the circuit court’s order and on November 4, 
2010, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed, finding that the 
lower court erroneously interpreted the DNA-testing statutes.
14
 
Additionally, the court ruled that in order for a new trial to be 
considered, an evidentiary hearing needed to be held to examine the 
DNA test results in light of the rest of the evidence presented in the 
case.
15
 
On August 19, 2011, before the evidentiary hearing took place, 
the West Memphis Three pled guilty to all three murders, all while 
asserting their innocence.
16
 Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley each 
entered what is known as an “Alford plea,”
17
 and the circuit judge 
sentenced the three men to eighteen years and seventy-eight days—
 
 9. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202 (2001) (amended 2005). 
 10. Echols II, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511, at *4. 
 11. Id. Additionally, after the public advocacy group Arkansas Take Action set up a 
confidential tip line, new evidence was uncovered, including multiple eyewitness statements that 
placed Hobbs with the victims immediately before they disappeared. The West Memphis 3 Are 
Free, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 19, 2011, 6:44 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/201108 
19005829/en/West-Memphis-3-Free. 
 12. Echols also submitted findings that many of the victims’ injuries were inflicted 
postmortem and that “the jury improperly considered Misskelley’s confession.” Echols II, 2010 
Ark. LEXIS 511, at *16 n.3. 
 13. Id. at *11. 
 14. Id. at *22–23. 
 15. Id. at *22. 
 16. See Max Brantley, Prosecutor’s Statement on West Memphis 3 Plea Deal, Arkansas 
Blog, ARK. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011, 12:11 PM), http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/ 
2011/08/19/prosecutors-statement-on-west-memphis-3-plea-deal. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
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the time they had already served in prison.
18
 After spending more 
than half their lives in jail, the West Memphis Three experienced 
freedom as adults for the very first time, but with the weight of 
admitting guilt bearing upon them. 
This Comment argues that the circuit court’s decision in 
Echols v. State
19
 took a step in the wrong direction when it 
countenanced the use of an Alford plea. The court admitted that 
“compelling evidence” existed that would acquit the West Memphis 
Three in a new trial.
20
 However, the Alford plea, as used in this case, 
allowed the State of Arkansas to appear as though it committed no 
wrong when it convicted and incarcerated the three boys nearly two 
decades ago. Part II sets forth in more detail the facts of the case and 
how the West Memphis Three came to use an Alford plea. Part III 
gives the background of Alford pleas, lays the foundation for when 
they are used, and discusses the inherent problems with their 
application. Part IV discusses the role that DNA evidence played in 
this case and why the use of the Alford plea was inappropriate here. 
Finally, Part V advocates for reform by urging judges to proceed 
with caution and to conduct a heightened standard of review prior to 
entering Alford pleas in cases involving DNA evidence. 
II.  THE MURDERS IN  
ROBIN HOOD HILLS 
On May 5, 1993, Michael Moore, Christopher Byers, and Steve 
Branch never returned to their homes after playing together in their 
West Memphis neighborhood.
21
 The following morning, the three 
boys were found dead, floating in a ditch bank in the Robin Hood 
Hills of West Memphis, Arkansas.
22
 Detectives found all three 
bodies naked and hog-tied, mutilated with wounds that had been 
allegedly caused by a serrated knife, and bruised from what 
investigators deemed to be the result of sexual abuse.
23
 The evidence 
 
 18. Campbell Robertson, Rare Deal Frees 3 in ’93 Arkansas Child Killings, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 20, 2011, at A1; see Order of Suspending Imposition of Sentence, and/or Judgment and 
Commitment at 1, Arkansas v. Echols, No. CR 1993-450P, 2011 WL 3794204 (Ark. Cir. 
Aug. 19, 2011). 
 19.  936 S.W.2d 509 (Ark. 1996). 
 20. Conditional Order for New Trial at 3, Arkansas v. Echols, No. CR 93-450A (Ark. Cir. 
Aug. 19, 2011). 
 21. Echols I, 936 S.W.2d 509, 516 (1996). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 516–17. 
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collected at the crime scene included the victims’ clothes, their 
shoes, and the shoelaces that were used to bind them,
24
 but there was 
no blood in sight.
25
 
Early on in the case, the West Memphis Police decided that the 
murders had likely been the result of a satanic ritual.
26
 The police’s 
conclusion led to Echols becoming their prime suspect due to his 
self-proclaimed Wiccan practice, asymmetrical black hair, pale skin, 
and interest in heavy metal music.
27
 Working under this assumption, 
the police questioned Echols’s friend, Jessie Misskelley, before 
Misskelley was even a suspect.
28
 During the four hours of 
interrogation, the police recorded only two fragments of the session, 
totaling less than an hour.
29
 Misskelley then implicated himself, 
Echols, and Baldwin as being responsible for the murders
30
 but 
recanted the confession later that evening.
31
 
Misskelley had an IQ of seventy-two and read at a third-grade 
level; however, neither the police that questioned him nor the court 
found these to be factors that affected his capability to comprehend 
the voluntariness of his confession.
32
 Misskelley’s statements were 
 
 24. Id. at 516. 
 25. See id. at 519 (stating that an expert witness at trial believed the absence of blood at the 
scene was due to cult rituals). Defense counsel argued that the nature of the victims’ injuries 
without any evidence of blood could have reasonably led to the conclusion that the murders did 
not take place at the crime scene. See PARADISE LOST, supra note 1. 
 26. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Op-Ed., False Convictions, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at 
A11; PARADISE LOST, supra note 1. 
 27. See Mnookin, supra note 26; see also PARADISE LOST, supra note 1 (Echols explained 
how the police had to find somebody because they were “under a lot of pressure” and “had to do 
something fast”). See generally Echols I, 936 S.W.2d at 517 (stating that detectives questioned 
Misskelley when Echols was a suspect because it was known that Echols, Baldwin, and 
Misskelley engaged in “cult-like activities”). 
 28. Misskelley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 702, 707 (Ark. 1996). 
 29. Overview, EXONERATE THE WM3, supra note 3 (“[Police] subjected [Misskelley] . . . to 
hours of questioning without counsel or parental consent, audio-taping only two fragments 
totaling [forty-six] minutes.”); see PARADISE LOST, supra note 1; see also Misskelley, 915 
S.W.2d at 712, 714 (stating that Misskelley was advised of his rights over the course of four 
hours and that the police’s failure to record the interrogation in its entirety did not invalidate the 
confession). 
 30. Misskelley, 915 S.W.2d at 706. 
 31. Overview, EXONERATE THE WM3, supra note 3; PARADISE LOST, supra note 1. 
 32. See Misskelley, 915 S.W.2d at 712; PARADISE LOST, supra note 1. Misskelley was tried 
separately from Echols and Baldwin. Echols I, 936 S.W.2d at 517. Misskelley’s confession was 
not allowed to be used in Echols and Baldwin’s trial; however, the jury knew of the confession 
when an officer on cross-examination “‘blurted out’ that Misskelley confessed.” Id. at 542. 
Instead of granting the defense’s motion for mistrial, the court merely instructed the jury to ignore 
the statement. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas found that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a mistrial. Id. at 542–43. 
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the strongest and “virtually the only evidence” offered against him at 
his trial,
33
 yet, in the eyes of the jury, the several inconsistencies in 
his statements did not appear to affect his credibility.
34
 
At Echols and Baldwin’s trial, witnesses testified to hearing 
Echols admit to the killings,
35
 but no tangible evidence or motive 
linked the West Memphis Three to the victims.
36
 The prosecution 
brought an expert in occultism to testify that the killings closely 
resembled cult-like rituals, but on cross-examination, the witness’s 
qualifications as an expert were significantly undermined.
37
 
Nonetheless, a panicked community and a rush to judgment were 
apparently strong enough to tip the scales against the West Memphis 
Three.
38
 Accordingly, Baldwin and Misskelley were both sentenced 
to life in prison and Echols received the death penalty for the 
murders of Moore, Byers, and Branch.
39
 
 
 33. Misskelley, 915 S.W.2d at 707. 
 34. See id. at 708–10. 
 35. Echols I, 936 S.W.2d at 518. The witnesses were a twelve-year-old girl and a fifteen-
year-old girl. See Chris Worthington, Case Info—Evidence Analysis, EXONERATE THE W. 
MEMPHIS THREE SUPPORT FUND, http://www.wm3.org/Evidence/Page/Evidence-Analysis (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Evidence Analysis, EXONERATE THE WM3] (discussing 
Echols’s overheard confession on linked pages 16 and 17). Both testified to overhearing Echols 
say he killed the victims, but upon cross-examination, neither witness could account for any other 
part of the statements heard nor the context in which she heard them. See PARADISE LOST, supra 
note 1; Evidence Analysis, EXONERATE THE WM3, supra. 
 36. See LEVERITT, supra note 3, at 337; see also Echols I, 936 S.W.2d at 518–19 (describing 
the prosecution’s evidence against Echols). A knife was found in a lake behind Baldwin’s home, 
and although there were no fingerprints or blood to connect the knife to the crime, the prosecution 
immediately concluded that it was reasonable to believe that the knife was the murder weapon. Id. 
at 541–42. The prosecution relied on the belief that the murders “were done in a satanic ritual” 
and used this as its theory of motive. Id. at 519. Drawings of upside-down crosses and 
pentagrams along with other “morbid images and references” found in Echols’s room supported 
this theory. Id. 
 37. See PARADISE LOST, supra note 1. The witness, Dr. Dale Griffis, admitted on cross-
examination that he received his doctorate from a mail-order form and did not receive any formal 
classroom training. Id.; see LEVERITT, supra note 3, at 236–37 (detailing the discovery that the 
prosecutor’s cult expert had received his Ph.D. from a mail-order form and did not receive any 
formal classroom training). However, the jury found Griffis’s testimony of having read 4,800 
books on occultism to be a compelling reason for convicting the defendants. See id. at 275. 
 38. See The West Memphis 3 Are Free, supra note 11, at 3; see also Overview, EXONERATE 
THE WM3, supra note 3, at 1 (“The police and the state managed to convince the media and the 
juries that ‘devil worshippers’ were responsible, and that [Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley] 
somehow fit that description. It was publicly stated by law enforcement officials and the media 
that the murders had been a part of a satanic ritual.”). 
 39. Echols I, 936 S.W.2d at 516; Misskelley, 915 S.W.2d at 707. 
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For almost two decades, Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley each 
attempted to appeal their convictions but were unsuccessful.
40
 Echols 
was able to get his execution date postponed but still faced the 
uncertainty of not knowing when his final day would come.
41
 
Finally, in 2002, an opportunity opened up for the West Memphis 
Three that shed new light on the case: Arkansas enacted new DNA-
testing statutes,
42
 and the West Memphis Three promptly moved the 
court to reopen the case and test the evidence previously collected.
43
 
The DNA testing failed to link Echols, Baldwin, or Misskelley to any 
of the victims.
44
 Relying primarily on these DNA testing results, 
Echols moved for a new trial in 2008.
45
 Echols also offered other 
evidence that “questioned the reliability of other aspects of the 
State’s evidence.”
46
 This evidence included affidavits admitting juror 
misconduct in the original trial
47
 and the opinions of multiple 
forensic specialists who concluded that most of the injuries to the 
victims resulted from postmortem animal predation and not from a 
serrated knife.
48
 Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the circuit 
court denied Echols’s motion for a new trial.
49
 
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit 
court’s order and found that the circuit court erred in denying Echols 
a new trial.
50
 The supreme court found that the DNA test results 
should have been considered in the lower court’s assessment of 
whether Echols presented “compelling evidence that a new trial 
would result in an acquittal,” and it remanded for an evidentiary 
 
 40. See Echols v. Arkansas, 520 U.S. 1244 (1997); Misskelley v. Arkansas, 519 U.S. 898 
(1996); Echols v. State (Echols III), 42 S.W.3d 467 (2001); Echols I, 936 S.W.2d 509. 
 41. See Piers Morgan, supra note 1. 
 42. See supra text accompanying notes 8–9. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See supra text accompanying notes 10–11. 
 45. Echols II, 2010 Ark. 417, at 4, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511, at *4. 
 46. David S. Mitchell, Jr., Lock ‘Em Up and Throw Away the Key: “The West Memphis 
Three” and Arkansas’s Statute for Post-Conviction Relief Based on New Scientific Evidence, 62 
ARK. L. REV. 501, 506–07 (2009). 
 47. See Damien Echols’ Brief on the Admissibility of Evidence of Juror Misconduct at 28–
36, Echols II, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511 (No. CR-93-450A), available at http://www.freewest 
memphis3.org/images/stories/pdfs/finalmisconductbrief.pdf. 
 48. Mitchell, Jr., supra note 46, at 507; see also Echols II, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511, at *16 n.3 
(describing Echols’s submission of various forensic specialists’ investigative results to the circuit 
court); supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing the source of the victims’ injuries). 
 49. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
 50. See Echols II, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511, at *23. 
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hearing.
51
 On August 19, 2011, four months before the evidentiary 
hearing was to take place, the West Memphis Three pled guilty to the 
murders with an Alford plea and were released from prison.
52
 
III.  ALFORD PLEAS— 
WHAT ARE THEY? 
Pleas come in a variety of forms.
53
 Under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, defendants may plead not guilty, guilty, or nolo 
contendere.
54
 Additionally, defendants may enter what is known as 
an Alford plea, which allows them to plead guilty while 
simultaneously proclaiming their innocence.
55
 
In 1963, Henry Alford was indicted for first-degree murder.
56
 
Faced with the death penalty and with strong evidence against him, 
Alford avoided going to trial by pleading guilty to second-degree 
murder while, at the same time, refusing to admit that he was, in fact, 
guilty.
57
 In North Carolina v. Alford,
58
 the U.S. Supreme Court 
found the plea that Alford used to be constitutional, holding that a 
defendant may “voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent 
to the imposition of a prison sentence even if . . . [he submits] a plea 
containing a protestation of innocence.”
59
 Furthermore, the Court 
required a clear demonstration of a “strong factual basis” for the plea 
in order for it to pass constitutional muster.
60
 Unable to draw any 
 
 51. Id. at *22. 
 52. See Suzie Parker, After 18 Years, “West Memphis 3” Go Free on Plea Deal, REUTERS 
(Aug. 19, 2011, 3:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/19/us-crime-westmemphis3-
arkansas-idUSTRE77I54A20110819. 
 53. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a). 
 54. Id. A nolo contendere (no contest) plea has been viewed as a “mild form of pleading 
guilty” and consists of a statement by the defendant that he will not contend against the charge 
made by the state. See C. T. Drechsler, Annotation, Plea of Nolo Contendere or Non Vult 
Contendere, 89 A.L.R.2d 540 (1963) (discussing the use of nolo contendere pleas and their 
effects and implications). Additionally, the court must consent to the use of a nolo contendere 
plea. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2). 
 55. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
 56. Id. at 26. 
 57. Id. at 28–29. 
 58. 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
 59. Id. at 37. 
 60. See id. at 38. Normally, a court need only find that a defendant has a factual basis for his 
plea. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3). Some federal courts, however, have chosen not to acknowledge a 
difference between Alford pleas and regular guilty pleas when it comes to finding a factual basis 
for the plea, requiring only a factual basis for either plea. See, e.g., United States v. Tunning, 69 
F.3d 107, 111 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that there is no difference between a defendant who pleads 
guilty and admits to acts constituting the crime and a defendant who pleads guilty and 
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material difference between a nolo contendere plea and a plea 
containing an active protestation of innocence, the Court recognized 
that the admission of guilt was “not a constitutional requisite to the 
imposition of criminal penalty.”
61
 
A.  The Problem with Alford Pleas 
Plea bargaining is typically seen as an advantageous tool for 
defendants, but there are certainly drawbacks to using the Alford 
plea. Some courts reject Alford pleas in order to “further the correct 
resolution of criminal cases,”
62
 while other courts simply fear the 
risk of inaccuracy and inconsistency.
63
 Another significant concern 
regarding Alford pleas is the message that they send to the public. 
When an Alford plea is used, the concern is that it will “imply[] that 
the law does not care” about justice
64
—that “[t]ruth, justice, self-
restraint, and respect for others take a back seat to procedural 
efficiency and freedom of choice.”
65
 The most significant problem, 
however, is when an actual innocent defendant uses the Alford 
plea.
66
 How can we allow a defendant who is actually innocent to 
admit guilt in front of his attorney, the judge, and the adverse party? 
In Alford, while the Supreme Court required a “strong factual 
basis” for Alford’s plea, the Court also suggested that the basic 
standard be just a “factual basis”
67
—which is to say that a court must 
have some reason to believe that the defendant might be guilty.
68
 
However, in theory, since few defendants are arrested and charged 
for crimes without some kind of evidence against them, virtually 
 
affirmatively protests his innocence); United States v. Morrow, 914 F.2d 608, 612 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(“[A]ny Rule 11 proceeding requires that a factual basis for the plea be established and we are 
unwilling to place more requirements in the context of an Alford plea.”). 
 61. Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. 
 62. Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1155 (2008) (Boehm, J., concurring). 
 63. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal 
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1381 
(2003). 
 64. Id. at 1403. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Cf. F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the 
Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 
189, 197–200 (2002) (exploring different roles in the plea-bargain system). 
 67. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 & n.10 (1970). 
 68. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 
1179, 1293 (1975). 
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every defendant in the criminal justice system might be guilty and, 
therefore, have some sort of factual basis for an Alford plea.
69
 
The Alford Court seemed more concerned with allowing a 
defendant to take control of the outcome of his case by “voluntarily, 
knowingly, and understandingly consent[ing]” to enter a guilty plea
70
 
rather than with ascertaining whether a defendant believes that he is 
actually guilty. The Court reasoned that whether or not Alford 
realized his guilt, he used the plea because he believed that he had 
“absolutely nothing to gain by a trial and much to gain by 
pleading.”
71
 
The West Memphis Three appeared to follow the Alford Court’s 
reasoning when they entered their Alford pleas. There is no doubt 
that Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley believed that they were 
innocent; however, in this case, the defendants used the Alford plea 
not for its truth-seeking function
72
 but to establish a “middle ground” 
in the eighteen-year battle between the prosecution and defense.
73
 
B.  Why Defendants Continue to Use Alford Pleas 
Judges have the discretion to deny Alford pleas,
74
 but most 
states have permitted their use.
75
 Scholars have praised Alford pleas 
as being an “efficient, constitutional means of resolving cases” and 
as a way to “empower defendants within a flawed system.”
76
 
Supporters also endorse Alford pleas as “further[ing] the interests of 
defendants . . . who want to avoid worse outcomes at trial,”
77
 while 
others see the pleas as simply protecting the dignity of defendants by 
preventing them from having to face public humiliation.
78
 The types 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See generally Jenny Elayne Ronis, The Pragmatic Plea: Expanding Use of the Alford 
Plea to Promote Traditionally Conflicting Interests of the Criminal Justice System, 82 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1389, 1416 (2010) (discussing how the Alford plea’s emphasis on requiring an independent 
factual basis promotes truth-seeking). 
 73. See Sheri Qualters, Defender Found the Audacity to End a Stalemate, NAT’L LAW 
JOURNAL (Jan. 2, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202537061339& 
slreturn=1 (“The thing that seemed logical, the only safe harbor, was the Alford plea.”). 
 74. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.11. Judges have discretion to accept or deny any type of plea. 
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A). 
 75. See Bibas, supra note 63, at 1372 n.52. 
 76. Id. at 1363. 
 77. Id. at 1373. 
 78. Id. at 1374. 
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of cases that typically see Alford pleas include sex offenses, heinous 
murders, and domestic violence.
79
 These cases often involve 
“difficult defendants” who refuse to admit to committing the 
crimes.
80
 In those cases, Alford pleas serve as a tool to ameliorate the 
shame that defendants may face and to alleviate their fear that their 
loved ones could reject them.
81
 
As the debate over the strengths and weaknesses of the Alford 
plea continues, there is no denying that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
found the plea constitutional and that thousands of criminal 
defendants enter Alford pleas every year.
82
 However, while the 
requirements of the Alford plea have not changed since 1970, it is 
unclear whether the Court logically contemplated future 
technological advances in obtaining evidence and how they might fit 
into a court’s inquiry into the “factual basis for the plea.” It is likely 
that “the quality of the evidence that most courts . . . demand to 
support the plea will fall short of that required by traditional rules of 
evidence and due process.”
83
 But what if the evidence presented is 
scientific evidence that not only falls short of establishing guilt but 
also presents a compelling claim of actual innocence? Surely, when 
it stated in a footnote that it believed in the importance of protecting 
the innocent,
84
 the Alford Court did not anticipate the development of 
technological advances that would provide for the scientific 
establishment of actual innocence, nor the part that these 
developments would play in meeting the “factual basis for the plea” 
standard. 
IV.  DNA EVIDENCE  
IN THE COURTROOM 
The legal system has seen the introduction of innumerable 
technological advances over the years, and genetic identification is 
now a common tool used in the courtroom. DNA evidence has 
exonerated the innocent, confirmed the guilty, established paternity, 
 
 79. Id. at 1378–79. 
 80. Id. at 1379. 
 81. See id. at 1378. 
 82. See Anne D. Gooch, Note, Admitting Guilt by Professing Innocence: When Sentence 
Enhancements Based on Alford Pleas Are Unconstitutional, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1765–66 
(2010). 
 83. Alschuler, supra note 68, at 1295. 
 84. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.10 (1970). 
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and allowed law enforcement to link crimes to persons who are 
already in their databases.
85
 As with all other things, DNA 
technology in the courtroom has both benefits and drawbacks, which 
are rapidly changing the American justice system while 
simultaneously presenting new legal dilemmas.
86
 
A.  DNA Evidence in the West Memphis Three Case 
At the time of the West Memphis Three trial, DNA evidence had 
just begun to make its debut in courtrooms across the nation.
87
 In 
2001, Arkansas introduced its DNA testing statutes to further “the 
mission of the criminal justice system . . . [and] to accommodate the 
advent of new technologies enhancing the ability to analyze new 
scientific evidence.”
88
 The West Memphis Three promptly moved 
for DNA testing under these new statutes, and the testing occurred 
between 2005 and 2007.
89
 A penile swab from one of the victims, 
hairs recovered from a tree stump at the crime scene, and hairs from 
a shoelace used to bind the victims were among the biological 
material tested, but they failed to link the West Memphis Three to 
any of the victims.
90
 Instead, the DNA was found to be consistent 
with one victim’s stepfather and his friend.
91
 
After Echols appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
requesting a new hearing, the court granted him an evidentiary 
hearing to “consider the DNA-test results ‘with all other evidence in 
the case . . .’ to determine if [it could be] ‘establish[ed] by 
compelling evidence that a new trial would result in an acquittal.’”
92
 
Although the DNA test results might have been “legally 
 
 85. See Julie A. Singer et al., The Impact of DNA and Other Technology on the Criminal 
Justice System: Improvements and Complications, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 87, 89–93 (2007). 
 86. See id. at 117–23. 
 87. See generally EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY 
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 4–7 (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/ 
dnaevid.pdf (discussing the increase in acceptance of DNA technology in the courts); George 
Bundy Smith & Janet A. Gordon, The Admission of DNA Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2465, 2481–86 (1997) (discussing the history of DNA evidence in the 
United States). 
 88. Echols II, 2010 Ark. 417, at 5–6, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511, at *5–6 (quoting Act of Apr. 19, 
2001, No. 1780, 2001 Ark. Acts 7736 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 116-112-201 to -207 
(Supp. 2001) (amended 2005))). 
 89. See supra text accompanying notes 8–10. 
 90. Echols II, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511, at *4. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at *22. 
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inconclusive,”
93
 they were “scientifically conclusive” because they 
showed that the West Memphis Three could not have been the source 
of the material tested.
94
 Additionally, not only did the DNA test 
results exclude Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley as sources of 
“several pieces of biological material that [had] differing connections 
to the crime scene . . . [but the results also failed to] exclude other 
persons connected to one of the victims.”
95
 
At the outset of the case, then-prosecutor John Fogleman 
admitted that the crime scene was “spotless” and that “[t]here was a 
remarkable lack of physical evidence against anybody.”
96
 The fact 
that the newly presented DNA evidence significantly undermined the 
little—yet only—evidence that convicted the West Memphis Three 
would likely cast reasonable doubt in the minds of any juror. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court of Arkansas correctly found that a new trial 
would likely result in an acquittal in light of this compelling new 
DNA evidence. 
B.  DNA Evidence in General 
For the past twenty years, the introduction of DNA evidence 
into the courtroom has continued to shake the criminal justice 
system.
97
 DNA evidence has proven actual innocence in cases where 
individuals have been convicted based on otherwise “solid and 
substantial evidence.”
98
 To this day, more than 280 people have been 
exonerated due to postconviction DNA relief.
99
 This solid and 
substantial evidence on which courts had relied before DNA 
evidence included eyewitness testimony, coerced confessions, 
 
 93. See id. at *13 (“[I]t is unclear to this court how DNA test results alone could ever 
produce legally-conclusive evidence of innocence . . . .”). 
 94. Id. at *14. 
 95. Id. at *16. 
 96. M.V. Moorhead, The Lost Boys: Metalhead Murder Trial Exhumed in Documentary 
Paradise Lost, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Nov. 14, 1996. 
 97. See Walter F. Rowe, Foreword to EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., supra note 87, at xv; 
Rockne Harmon, Foreword to EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., supra note 87, at xix; see also Singer 
et al., supra note 85, at 96–97 (discussing how the most important technological advance 
benefitting the criminal justice system has been DNA testing). 
 98. See Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence 
and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 595 (2002). 
 99. About—Mission Statement, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
about/Mission-Statement.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2011). 
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government conduct, and other forms of forensic science.
100
 
Unfortunately, in many cases, eyewitness testimony has been shown 
to be highly unreliable, confessions have been false, and government 
conduct and other forms of forensic science have been improper.
101
 
With the gradual movement of Innocence Projects
102
 securing 
the release of innocent individuals from prison, “legislators [have] 
recognized the importance of DNA testing postconviction.”
103
 DNA 
testing statutes have been implemented in almost all fifty states,
104
 
and the federal government has sought to establish a guideline for 
states to improve and expand on postconviction DNA testing 
procedures.
105
 The U.S. Supreme Court has even acknowledged that 
“DNA testing has an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the 
wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty.”
106
 DNA evidence has 
the capability to be dispositive—while it does not have the capability 
to prove an individual “innocent in the eyes of the law,” it does have 
the power to scientifically prove an individual’s innocence.
107
 
Indeed, this powerful claim of actual innocence has a unique force in 
our criminal justice system that can tip the scales of justice in a 
defendant’s favor. 
 
 100. See Understand the Causes, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
understand/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2011); see also EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., supra note 87, at 15, 
18–20 (discussing evidence used in trials that led to wrongful convictions); Peter Neufeld & 
Barry C. Scheck, Foreword to EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., supra note 87, at xxx  (“Mistaken 
eyewitness identification, coerced confessions, unreliable forensic laboratory work, law 
enforcement misconduct, and ineffective representation . . . remain the leading causes of wrongful 
convictions.”). 
 101. See generally CONNORS ET AL., supra note 87, at 24–25 (discussing the unreliability of 
eyewitness testimony and non-DNA analyses of forensic evidence); Priority Issues: Eyewitness 
Identification, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Eyewitness-
Identification.php (last visited Oct. 16, 2011) (“The most common element in all wrongful 
convictions later overturned by DNA evidence has been eyewitness misidentification.”). 
 102. “The Innocence Project is a national . . . organization dedicated to exonerating 
wrongfully convicted individuals through DNA testing and reforming the criminal justice 
system . . . .” INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
 103. Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2921–22 
(2010). 
 104. Id. at 2922. 
 105. See Justice for All Act of 2004, H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2004); U.S. DEPT. OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES (OVC) FACT SHEET, THE JUSTICE FOR ALL ACT 1 
(2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/factshts/justforall/fs000311.pdf. 
 106. Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2312 (2009). 
 107. See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 98, at 599 (quoting United States v. Herrera, 506 
U.S. 390, 419 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
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C.  Should There Be More Scrutiny Before  
Courts Accept Alford Pleas in DNA Cases? 
At the time when Alford was decided, DNA evidence did not yet 
exist in the courtroom,
108
 and it is difficult to know whether the 
Supreme Court actually anticipated the forthcoming revolution in 
forensic science. The Alford Court rendered it constitutional for a 
defendant to plead guilty while concurrently maintaining his 
innocence when there is a clear demonstration of a “strong factual 
basis for the plea.”
109
 But can there actually be a strong factual 
basis—or even just a plain factual basis—for guilt if scientific 
evidence proves otherwise? 
As discussed above, DNA findings have definitively resulted in 
establishing innocence.
110
 If DNA evidence is powerful enough to 
prove an individual’s actual innocence, then a court must carefully 
examine this evidence to determine if there is a factual basis for an 
Alford plea. Not doing so would only open the doors of injustice and 
allow innocent defendants to slide right past the judges and into our 
prisons. 
Furthermore, the Alford Court held that an Alford plea is 
constitutional as long as the plea consists of “a voluntary and 
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action.”
111
 It 
would be difficult to imagine a defendant with compelling DNA 
evidence that established his innocence voluntarily and intelligently 
admitting guilt unless, of course, there were no other alternative 
courses of action to choose from. In order for a defendant to avoid 
such a dilemma, it is important for courts to apply a standard of strict 
scrutiny before they accept Alford pleas in these instances. Only 
such a detailed and probing inquiry can help provide an additional 
safeguard to the innocent defendant. 
 
 108. Alford, decided in 1970, preceded the DNA revolution that hit the courtrooms in the late 
1980s. See Garrett, supra note 103, at 2921. 
 109. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970). 
 110. See supra text accompanying notes 98–100; see also Jay D. Aronson & Simon A. Cole, 
Science and the Death Penalty: DNA, Innocence, and the Debate over Capital Punishment in the 
United States, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 603, 617 (2009) (explaining how DNA evidence can 
provide epistemological closure for disputed convictions). 
 111. Alford, 400 U.S. at 31. 
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V.  THE NEED  
FOR REFORM 
The Circuit Court of Craighead County, Arkansas, should have 
dismissed the West Memphis Three case rather than let the 
defendants enter Alford pleas. The court failed to focus on the 
evidence in the case and thus allowed the defendants to plead guilty 
when a guilty plea clearly should not have been used. Indeed, 
although the West Memphis Three fought an eighteen-year battle to 
achieve their freedom, an Alford plea was the wrong vehicle to 
administer this achievement. In the end, what the West Memphis 
Three obtained was defective freedom. 
At the heart of our criminal justice system lie the constitutional 
goals of providing fairness and protection of individual rights for 
all.
112
 The system is not perfect. Economic pressures leading to a 
deficiency in resources, overcriminalization, faulty procedures and 
practices, and wrongful convictions of innocent individuals are just a 
few of the problems contributing to this broken system.
113
 With these 
imperfections in mind, it is essential to address the challenges and 
aim to further the progression and improvement of our criminal 
justice system. 
Here, the underlying issue is whether a court should 
countenance the use of an Alford plea when evidence exists—
especially DNA evidence—proving that the person is in fact 
innocent of the crime charged. The answer is simple: no. 
The West Memphis Three entered Alford pleas because they 
“felt it was in their ‘best interest’” to do so.
114
 Upon his release from 
prison, Echols stated: “Sometimes justice is neither pretty nor is it 
perfect, but it was important to take this opportunity to be free.”
115
 It 
is no surprise that the West Memphis Three believed that it was in 
their “best interest” to plead guilty. With Echols’s looming execution 
date or the potential of another drawn-out trial, the Alford plea 
 
 112. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 138–39, 154 (1967). 
 113. See THE SMART ON CRIME COALITION, SMART ON CRIME: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS, at xi–iii (2011), http://www.besmartoncrime.org/pdf/ 
Executive_Summary.pdf. 
 114. Kenneth Heard et al., 3 Plead Guilty to Murders, Are Set Free, ARK. DEMOCRATIC 
GAZETTE, Aug. 20, 2011, at 6A. 
 115. The West Memphis 3 Are Free, supra note 11. 
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appeared to be the best option.
116
 Although, as mentioned above, 
there are reasons why individuals find Alford pleas to be beneficial, 
it is doubtful that this case illustrates the rationalization for those 
benefits. 
Nonetheless, the West Memphis Three cannot be grouped into 
the same category as innocent individuals who plead guilty to crimes 
that they did not commit merely to avoid harsher punishments
117
 or 
“recidivist innocent defendants” who simply want to avoid the costs 
of taking a case to trial.
118
 Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley 
presented the court with scientifically conclusive evidence indicating 
their innocence—not even procedural efficiency can justify such an 
unsubstantiated guilty plea here or ignore the importance of 
innocence and fairness.
119
 
In our criminal justice system, all elements necessary to 
constitute the crime charged must be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt
120
—which is consistent with the requirements of 
due process.
121
 If that standard is not met, the defendant must be 
acquitted.
122
 To say that reasonable doubt is not cast upon the mind 
of a reasonable person when the existence of DNA evidence shows 
an individual’s innocence is nonsensical. 
Here, the finger must not be pointed at the “reasonable person” 
but instead at the judge. Judges must take seriously their independent 
responsibility to ensure that they can support an Alford plea with a 
true, factual basis.
123
 Judges must not abuse their discretion when 
they confront an Alford plea;
124
 they must not “fall[] prey to the 
 
 116. See Piers Morgan, supra note 1. 
 117. Gooch, supra note 82, at 1761–62; see also Laurie L. Levenson, Unnerving the Judges: 
Judicial Responsibility for the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 787, 819 (2001) 
(observing that defendants facing life imprisonment under California’s Three Strikes Law may 
feel pressured to forego the right to trial). 
 118. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1130–36 (2008) 
(discussing the benefits for innocent defendants in low-stakes cases to plea bargain in order to 
avoid the high costs of trial). 
 119. See Bibas, supra note 63, at 1408. 
 120. 1A FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 12:10 (5th ed.) (“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
must . . . be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to 
rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs.”). 
 121. 2A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 403 (4th ed.) (“The requirement that the prosecution 
has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required by due process.”). 
 122. Laura Alexander, Proof Issues, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 641, 641–42 
(2006). 
 123. Levenson, supra note 117, at 815–18. 
 124. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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practice of routinely skipping over the factual basis” inquiry.
125
 In 
other words, judges must not sit idly by and let innocent defendants 
plead guilty when evidence proves otherwise. 
When a judge is confronted with compelling evidence of actual 
innocence, he or she can either (1) allow the innocent defendant to 
plead guilty, which would be a complete misuse of justice and a 
bastardization of our criminal justice system; or (2) dismiss the case. 
A guilty plea is not only an admission of conduct, it is a 
conviction.
126
 Therefore, judges must provide an additional 
safeguard for these defendants and not condone such a lax 
examination of factual basis. When the evidence shows innocence, 
the court simply should not accept the guilty plea. 
The circuit court found “compelling evidence” that a new trial 
would result in an acquittal, yet it consented to Echols, Baldwin, and 
Misskelley signing on record that they each caused the deaths of the 
three boys and knew or had reason to know that the victims were 
particularly vulnerable.
127
 Considering the wide media attention that 
this case received and the enhanced criticism of the way in which the 
trial was conducted, the circuit court should have taken a more 
cautious approach by examining the evidence presented with strict 
scrutiny rather than quickly acting to make the case disappear.  
Under this heightened standard of review, courts cannot evade 
the central purposes of the Alford plea by allowing one to be entered 
prior to conducting a close assessment of all the facts at hand. 
Efficiency should not come at the price of unfair adjudication.
128
 In 
order to ensure a higher quality of justice, judges cannot remain 
passive. Rather, they should make every effort to take responsibility 
to fulfill their constitutional obligations and “contribute to the 
improvement of . . . the administration of justice.”
129
  
Here, the circuit court failed to take on that responsibility and 
missed an opportunity to identify and redress one of the many 
problems in our justice system. Consequently, the injustice that 
 
 125. Levenson, supra note 117, at 817. 
 126. Id. at 798. 
 127. Conditional Order For New Trial at 3, Arkansas v. Echols, No. CR 93-450 (Ark. Cir. 
Aug. 19, 2011) (emphasis added); Prosecutor’s Short Report of Circumstances at 1, Echols v. 
State, 2010 Ark. 417, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511 (No. CR-93-450A). 
 128. Levenson, supra note 117, at 819. 
 129. See id. at 803 (quoting MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4B (2000)). 
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occurred resulted in the West Memphis Three acquiring their 
freedom at the cost of their innocence. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The circuit court’s decision in Echols v. State was an immense 
step backward in the progression of our criminal justice system. 
Courts should not accept guilty pleas when enough compelling 
evidence exists that clearly shows that an individual is not linked to 
the crime for which he or she has been charged. Judges must not sit 
back with their hands tied; instead, they must take the responsibility 
to conduct a factual-basis inquiry with strict scrutiny in order to 
prevent the injustice of allowing an innocent defendant to plead 
guilty. The Echols court’s allowance of an Alford plea was 
inappropriate because there was enough evidence to establish the 
West Memphis Three’s innocence but not enough of a factual basis 
for the Alford plea. As a result, the West Memphis Three have to 
bear the weight of admitting guilt while scientific evidence lurks 
within the shadows of doubt that could ultimately lift that weight off. 
If Arkansas truly seeks to carry out “the mission of the criminal 
justice system . . . and accommodate the advent of new 
technologies . . . [and] new scientific evidence,”
130
 then the court 
should have viewed the DNA results from this case as being 
compelling evidence of factual innocence and dismissed this case. 
West Memphis Three supporters spent eighteen years and 
seventy-eight days asking the court to “Free the West Memphis 
Three.”
131
 And while Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley are surely 
“free” from sitting behind bars for the rest of their lives, the Alford 
plea has certainly not freed them from guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 130. See supra text accompanying note 88. 
 131. See, e.g., EXONERATE THE WEST MEMPHIS THREE SUPPORT FUND, http://wm3.org (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2012); FREE WEST MEMPHIS 3, http://www.freewestmemphis3.org (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2011). 
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